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1. Introduction  
Although it is widely accepted that expansion of private investment is the main catalyst for 
generating long-run growth in developing countries, the response of private investment to various 
financial sector policies has received little attention in the analysis of investment behavior. An 
understanding of the way financial sector policies impact on private investment is important given 
that a number of developing countries have undergone significant financial sector reforms over the 
last few decades, leading to a widely observed increase in the degree of financial globalization. 
Drawing on the financial liberalization thesis of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), this study 
addresses the question of how government intervention in the financial systems (including directed 
credit programs, interest rate controls, and reserve and liquidity requirements) affects the evolution 
of private investment in two rapidly growing developing economies – India and Malaysia. 
Understanding how each type of financial sector policies affects private investment provides some 
insight into the costs and benefits associated with each component of financial reforms.  
 
This study is related to several strands of literature. One has explored the determinants of private 
investment for developing countries (e.g., Greene and Villanueva, 1991; Athukorala and Sen, 
2002; Serven, 2003; Guimaraes and Unteroberdoerster, 2006; Kinkyo, 2007). Another strand has 
attempted to examine the impact of financial sector reforms on macroeconomic variables such as 
private saving, productivity of capital, or financial deepening in developing economies (e.g., 
Demetriades and Luintel, 1996b, 1997; Demetriades, Devereux and Luintel, 1998; Bandiera, 
Caprio, Honohan and Schiantarelli, 2000; Ang and McKibbin, 2007; Ang, 2008a, b). Our work is 
also similar in some respects to that of Emran, Shilpi and Alam (2007), who assess the effects of 
financial liberalization on the price responsiveness of private investment in India. Their results 
indicate that private investment has become more sensitive to a change in the cost of capital after 
liberalization. However, unlike theirs, our focus is on the role of financial sector policies in 
determining private investment.  
 
This paper aims to complement the above studies, and enrich the literature by providing further 
evidence on how financial sector policies affect the evolution of private investment, drawing on the 
experience of two leading developing economies that have undergone significant financial sector 
reforms. We focus on just two economies instead of a larger sample given that the effects of 
financial sector policies may be heterogeneous across countries at different stages of economic 
development. Case studies are particularly useful in disentangling the complexity of the financial Page 3 of 28 
environments and economic histories of each individual country. By analyzing case studies, the 
econometric findings of this project can be related to the prevailing institutional structure, and 
therefore inform academic as well as policy debate. 
 
Several interesting features emerge from a comparative analysis of the economies of India 
and Malaysia. Firstly, both are high growth developing economies with British common law origins. 
Secondly, Malaysia was one of several economies severely hit by the 1997-98 Asian financial 
crisis while the economy of India was largely unaffected by this episode of financial turbulence. In 
Malaysia’s case there has been a sharp decline in gross domestic investment following the 1997-
98 crisis. This decline has emanated predominantly from private investment whereas public 
investment has been significantly boosted as part of the crisis management program. However, it 
is not clear whether such government pump-priming efforts will be sustainable in the long run. 
Consequently, this disappointing trend in private investment has become a major concern in the 
economic policy debate in the crisis-affected Asian countries (see, e.g., Guimaraes and 
Unteroberdoerster, 2006;  Kinkyo, 2007). 
 
In the case of financial sector reforms, Malaysia initiated a series of financial liberalization 
programs in 1978 whereas India launched its reforms in the financial system much later in 1991. 
Surprisingly, the financial liberalization path pursued in each country is remarkably similar despite 
their different starting points. Both countries have followed the conventional recommendations of a 
gradual reform approach for interest rate liberalization and reserve and liquidity requirements 
reduction. However, quite apart from these liberalization measures, significant directed credit 
controls favoring certain priority sectors in the economies have remained in force in both countries. 
Notwithstanding their financial systems remaining partially restricted, India and Malaysia have 
achieved significant improvements in their financial sector development. In India, the ratio of 
private credit to GDP has increased from just 9 percent in 1960 to 45 percent in 2005. During the 
same period, this indicator of financial development increased significantly from just 7 percent to 
117 percent in Malaysia. Finally, both India and Malaysia have a relatively good database by the 
standards of developing countries, providing an added incentive for the research.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the financial 
repression and liberalization experience of India and Malaysia. Section 3 discusses the private 
investment function derived from the neoclassical framework. This conventional framework is then 
modified to provide an alternative specification by incorporating the role of financial sector policies 
into the private investment equation. Section 4 sets out the empirical model and explains the 
construction of variables. A cost minimization approach is adopted in Section 5, to introduce 
dynamics into the model, by assuming that firms optimize their investment levels with respect to a Page 4 of 28 
quadratic loss function. This dynamic private investment function is then estimated using the 
appropriate time series techniques in order to provide an analysis of the short-run dynamics as well 
as the long-run relationship between private investment and its determinants. Section 6 presents 
and analyses the econometric estimates of the private investment function covering the period 
1950-2005 for India, and 1959-2005 for Malaysia. Finally, we summarize the main findings and 
conclude in the last section. 
 
2. Financial Sector Reforms in India and Malaysia 
There was little financial repression in the financial system of India during the 1950s and 1960s. 
However, the government gradually imposed more controls by raising reserve and liquidity 
requirements in the 1970s and 1980s. Revenue from financial repression was estimated to be 22.4 
percent of total central government revenue during the period 1980-85 (see Giovannini and De 
Melo, 1993). Furthermore, several interest rate controls were implemented in the late 1980s. A 
series of comprehensive financial sector reform policies were undertaken in 1991 as part of the 
broader economic reform. It was aimed at changing the entire orientation of India’s financial 
development strategy from its position of a financially repressed system to that of a more open, 
market-type system. Since then, interest rates were gradually liberalized and reserve and liquidity 
requirements significantly reduced so that the market could play a greater role in price 
determination and resource allocation. 
 
However, despite the liberalization programs launched in the early 1990s, the Indian financial 
system has continued to operate within the context of repressionist policies. In particular, 
significant directed credit programs favoring certain priority sectors still prevail in the banking 
system. Moreover, although the government divested part of its equity position in some public 
banks in the 1990s, the banking sector has remained predominantly state-owned due to the bank 
nationalization program in 1969, which has enabled the Reserve Bank of India to effectively 
implement its credit allocation policy. As such, it appears that repressionist measures coexist with 
a set of liberalization policies aimed at promoting free allocation of resources. 
 
Turning to Malaysia, the Central Bank of Malaysia has actively pursued interest rate liberalization, 
with the objective of developing a more market-driven financial system. The Bank followed a 
gradual approach in interest rate reforms, beginning in the 1970s by cautiously liberalizing interest 
rates. The major phase of interest rate liberalization occurred in 1978 when commercial banks 
were allowed to set deposit and lending rates freely. The liberalization policies adopted seem to 
have worked well at the early stage of development as significant financial deepening was taking 
place. In the 1980s, the Malaysian financial sector underwent a radical transformation along with Page 5 of 28 
expansion in the economy. The upshot of this transformation was the emergence of a broader, 
deeper, more organized and better structured financial system.  
 
However, Malaysia has never completely and consistently liberalized its financial sector. The 
reform programs appear to have been narrow in scope, with much of the effort focused on 
eliminating interest controls. Quite apart from the liberalization policies pursued, a series of 
directed credit programs were implemented in 1975. During that year, at least 50 percent of total 
lending made by banks had to be advanced to the native Malay community. The requirement was 
reduced to 20 percent in the following year, and then adjusted upward to 30 percent in 1996. 
These financial sector policies, liberalization or repression, and the development that follows, can 
have a significant impact on the evolution of private investment activities in Malaysia. 
 
3. Analytical Framework 
3.1 The neoclassical investment model 
The neoclassical investment model of Jorgenson (1963) postulates that the desired capital stock 
depends on the level of output and the user cost of capital. Lags in delivery and decision making 
create a gap between current and desired capital stocks, giving rise to an investment equation in 
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where gross investment ( t I ) is represented by the sum of a distributed lag on the past changes in 
desired capital stock and replacement investment, d is the rate of depreciation of capital stock (Kt), 
which is usually assumed to be constant. Hence, this simple neoclassical framework assumes that 




3.2 Modifications and Extensions  
(a) Public investment 
Several authors have argued that public investment may be complementary to, rather than 
competing with, private investment in developing countries. Public investment may facilitate and 
stimulate private investment through the provision of infrastructural support (Sundararajan and 
Thakur, 1980; Blejer and Khan, 1984). This could raise the productivity of capital and expand the 
overall resource availability by increasing output. On the other hand, public investment may also 
crowd out private investment. This occurs when additional public investment requires raising future 
tax and domestic interest rates, or if the public sector produces investment goods that directly 
                                                 
1 Although the Tobin’s Q model is also widely adopted in the literature, this model is not suitable in the 
current context due to the lack of reliable stock market time series data for both India and Malaysia. Page 6 of 28 
compete with private goods. In addition, the utilization of additional physical and financial 
resources, which would otherwise be available to the private sector, may also depress private 
investment (Blejer and Khan, 1984; Aschauer, 1989). Therefore, the impact of public investment on 
private investment is theoretically indeterminate. 
 
 
(b) Financial sector policies 
The Jorgenson investment model assumes a perfect financial market, where the firm faces 
an unlimited supply of capital. It is not difficult to see that under this framework, the user cost of 
capital is a crucial determinant of private investment. Within this context, attention has traditionally 
been focused on the implications of investment tax credits and depreciation rules on cost of capital. 
Under repressed financial systems, however, firms do not have access to unlimited supply of 
credit, as would be the case postulated under the neoclassical framework where a perfectly 
competitive market prevails. In fact, developing countries are often characterized by credit 
constraints due to market imperfections such as asymmetric information and agency problems 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Imperfections in credit markets may prevent firms from borrowing as 
much as they would wish. Such a constraint will in general discourage the undertaking of 
investment projects.  
 
Empirical studies that focus on analyzing the impact of financial deregulation on private investment 
have tended to emphasize the relaxation of borrowing constraints. The standard proxy used to 
capture the effect of financial liberalization has been real bank credit to the private sector or the 
ratio of bank credit to GDP. Financial liberalization does not necessarily lead to reduced financial 
constraint, and results in more funds intermediated in the market (see, e.g., Ang and McKibbin, 
2007). Therefore, the effect of financial liberalization has to be captured separately by considering 
an appropriate proxy for it in the model specification. A more satisfactory approach to assessing 
the effect of financial sector reforms would explicitly account for each component of the reform 
programs. This would provide a more complete analysis of the costs and benefits associated with 
financial repression or liberalization. Thus, the overall effectiveness of the entire reform programs 
would depend on the relative strength of each type of financial sector policies implemented. 
Analysis performed at the disaggregated level also helps identify an appropriate mix of financial 
liberalization and repressionist policies that is effective in stimulating private investment.  
 
The early literature on financial liberalization, initiated by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), 
challenges the financial repressionist ideology and provide a new paradigm in the design of 
financial policies. They argue that financial repressionist policies are largely accountable for the 
poor economic performance of developing countries in the 1960s, where credit rationing and low Page 7 of 28 
investment were prevalent. Investment suffered both in terms of quantity and quality as funds were 
allocated at the discretion of policy makers instead of following free market forces. Their theories 
suggest that distortions in the financial systems, such as loans issued at an artificially low interest 
rate, directed credit programs and high reserve requirements are all unwise and unnecessary. 
These can reduce saving, retard capital accumulation and prevent efficient resource allocation. 
Therefore, they call for financial liberalization, which refers to the process of eliminating or 
significantly alleviating financial system distortions, in order to stimulate private investment and 
growth. 
 
However, some counter arguments suggest that financial liberalization may not necessarily lead to 
higher investment. For instance, the neostructuralist contributions of van Wijnbergen (1982) and 
Taylor (1983) suggest that the impact of lower taxation on financial systems may reduce the flow of 
credit to the private sector. Since the formal financial systems are subject to reserve requirements, 
which involve a leakage in the intermediation process, the neostructuralists argue that curb 
(unorganized) markets perform more efficiently in intermediating savers and investors. A rise in the 
bank deposit rates following financial liberalization induces households to substitute curb market 
loans for bank deposits, resulting in a fall in the supply of loanable funds. Thus, in the presence of 
efficient curb markets, removing interest rate restraints discourages private investment activities. 
Moreover, with deposit insurance, the absence of interest rate controls may result in overly risky 
lending behavior among banks due to moral hazard problems (Villanueva and Mirakhor, 1990; 
McKinnon and Pill, 1997). 
 
Stiglitz (1994) also argues that interest rate restraints may lead to higher financial saving in the 
presence of good governance in the financial systems. When depositors perceive restrictions as 
policies aimed at enhancing the stability of the financial systems, they may well be more willing to 
keep their savings in the form of bank deposits, thereby providing more resources for investment in 
the absence of perfect capital mobility. Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (1996) show that in a 
competitive equilibrium, banks have no incentive to attract new customers and deepen market 
penetration since their profit margin on deposits is zero due to intense competition. However, if the 
government imposed a deposit rate ceiling, banks can make positive returns and therefore have an 
incentive to attract more depositors, as long as the market is not fully penetrated. Thus, deposit 
rate controls can induce banks to spend more resources on deepening the financial systems, 
which enable more investment activity to be carried out. In a similar vein, Honohan and Stiglitz 
(2001) argue that interest rate ceiling can effectively reduce reckless banking competition and 
allow for differential rewards of different risks. 
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In the case of reserve requirements, the neostructuralists view them in the same way as the 
McKinnon-Shaw school of thought since these requirements constitute a leakage in the 
intermediation process (Fry, 1995). However, Courakis (1984) shows that under the condition 
where the demand for loanable funds is not perfectly inelastic, higher reserve requirements may 
increase the profit-maximization deposit rate and hence the volume of loanable funds. Using a 
general equilibrium model, Bencivenga and Smith (1992) show that the optimal degree of financial 
repression depends on the size of government deficits. In the presence of large government 
deficits, it will be desirable to impose higher reserve requirements. Their model also shows that 
financial liberalization will not increase capital formation since savings in the formal sector translate 
into lower investment than savings in the informal sector due to the absence of reserve 
requirements. 
 
Furthermore, Kim and Santomero (1988) and Gennotte and Pyle (1991) show that capital 
requirements increase a bank’s portfolio risk and hence may result in inefficient allocation of 
resources. This is arguably the case when the funds related to these repressionist programs are 
not allocated efficiently to generate productive returns. More recently, Hellmann, Murdock and 
Stiglitz (2000) use a dynamic model of moral hazard to show that capital requirements can be used 
as a prudential tool to help combat moral hazard problems. However, a Pareto-optimal outcome 
can only be achieved by a combination of capital requirements and deposit rate controls in order to 
increase the incentives of banks to invest prudently.  
 
The implementation of directed credit programs generally involves the administered allocation of 
credit to priority sectors, mainly agriculture and small-scale industry. Without such interventions, 
banks generally will not fund those activities with low returns. Although the McKinnon-Shaw thesis 
advocates the removal of directed credit programs since they displace investment projects with 
potentially higher returns, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that financial liberalization is unlikely to 
result in allocative efficiency. This is because under asymmetric information, banks will practice 
credit rationing and be reluctant to raise interest rates in response to higher demand for loans due 
to adverse selection problems. Furthermore, directed credit programs may lead to increased 
investments in the targeted sectors, which may generate productive gains throughout the economy 
(Schwarz, 1992). Given the above, it appears that the impact of each of these financial sector 
policies on private investment is theoretically ambiguous. 
 
4. Empirical Specification and Construction of Variables 
Based on the above discussion, our specification for the private investment function combines the 
neoclassical investment factors with public sector investment and three types of financial sector Page 9 of 28 
policies. Specifically, it is postulated that the steady-state relationship for the real private 
investment (It) equation can be given as follows: 
( , , ,  ,  ,  ) tt t t t t t I f GDP COC PUB DCP IRR RLR =                (2) 
The independent variables, with the expected signs in the parentheses, are given as: 
GDPt =    real output (+) 
COCt  =  real user cost of capital (–) 
PUBt  =  real public investment (?) 
DCPt =    directed credit programs (?) 
IRRt =    interest rate restraints (?) 
RLRt =    reserve and liquidity requirements (?) 
 
The neoclassical investment model predicts that GDPt should have a positive effect on private 
investment whereas COCt discourages private investment. PUBt may crowd in or crowd out It. The 
impact of each type of financial sector policies on private investment is theoretically ambiguous. 
The above private investment specification also includes a dummy variable in the analysis for 
Malaysia to account for the impact of the Asian financial crisis, which takes the value of 1 for the 
period 1997-98.  
 
Annual data covering the period 1950-2005 for India and 1959-2005 for Malaysia are used in the 
empirical analysis. The data for India are directly obtained or compiled from the National Accounts 
Statistics of the Government of India, the Annual Reports and Reports on Currency and Finance of 
the Reserve Bank of India. For Malaysia, the data are collected from the Economic Report of the 
Ministry of Finance, and the Annual Reports and Monthly Statistical Bulletin of the Central Bank of 
Malaysia. Except for the financial policy variables, which may carry a zero value, all variables are 
measured in natural logarithms.  
 
It and PUBt are measured by gross capital formation in the private and public sectors, respectively. 
The gross capital formation deflator is used to express them in real terms. Following the standard 
practice, we use gross domestic product at constant price as the measure of real output (GDPt). 
The user cost of capital (COCt) is constructed using an analytical expression similar to that of Hall 
and Jorgenson (1969), which can be formulated as  () /
Ke
tt tttt COC P i P πδ =− + . Price of capital 
(
K
t P ) is measured by the gross capital formation deflator, it is the average lending rate, the 
expected rate of inflation (
e
t π ) is constructed using contemporaneous percentage change in the 
GDP deflator, the depreciation rate (δt) is assumed to be constant at 10%, and Pt is the GDP 
deflator.  
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The measure for reserve and liquidity requirements (RLRt) is given by the sum of the cash liquidity 
ratio and the statutory reserve requirement. The former requires banks to hold part of their deposits 
in the form of cash balances at the central banks whereas the latter imposes a requirement for 
banks to keep a share of their asset in government securities at below-market interest rates. For 
Malaysia,  DCPt is measured by the priority sector target lending rate of the native Malay 
community.
2 Hence, it is a de jure measure that reflects the strength of directed credit controls 
designed to repress the financial system in Malaysia. However, such a measure is not available for 
India on a consistent and reliable basis. Therefore, we follow the approach of Demetriades and 
Luintel (1996b, 1997) by using a de facto measure, which involves measuring the share of actual 
directed credit in total credit. Specifically, it is measured by 0, 1, 2 and 3 when the programs cover 
zero, up to 20 percent, 21 to 40 percent, and more than 40 percent, respectively, of total bank loan. 
 
To provide a measure of the interest rate restraints (IRRt), we collect a number of interest rate 
repressionist policies imposed on the Indian and Malaysian financial systems.  In principle, these 
interest rate policy variables can be used individually in the empirical specification in order to 
assess the effectiveness of each policy. However, this may give rise to some econometric 
problems due to the small samples used in this study. Moreover, the underlying policy variables 
may be highly correlated since the central banks may jointly impose some of these controls. One 
solution to these problems is to reduce the number of policy variables to just one summary 
measure, reflecting their joint influence (Demetriades and Luintel, 1996a; Demetriades, Devereux 
and Luintel, 1998). 
 
Since we want to summarize the interest rate policy variables to obtain an overall measure of 
interest rate restraint, the method of principal component analysis seems to be a natural choice. It 
is a systematic and sophisticated way of examining the patterns of relationship among the 
variables, with the objective of summarizing the information content of several observed variables 
into a handful of representative principal components. The method involves computing the linear 
combinations of the original variables that capture their maximum variance. These components 
can capture a large proportion of the variance in the original variables and can therefore serve the 
same purpose as the full set of original variables, but in a much more succinct manner. The 
various principal components are uncorrelated to each other. Therefore, given its conciseness, this 
approach sufficiently deals with the problems of multicollinearity and over-parameterization.  
 
                                                 
2 Although priority loans are also extended to other sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, small and 
medium size enterprises and individuals (for housing loans), the Malay community is the largest beneficiary 
group under this program. We focus only on the latter since data for target lending rate to other priority 
sectors are not available on a consistent basis. Page 11 of 28 
Specifically, we collect six series of interest rate repressionist policies for each country. For 
Malaysia, these include a maximum lending rate for priority sectors, a policy intervention rate, a 
minimum lending rate, a maximum lending rate, a minimum deposit rate and a maximum deposit 
rate. The construction of this index for India involves a fixed deposit rate, a deposit rate ceiling, a 
deposit rate floor, a fixed lending rate, a lending rate ceiling and a lending rate floor. These policy 
controls are translated into dummy variables which take the value of 1 if a control is present and 0 
otherwise. 
 
The results of the principal component analysis are presented in the Appendix. In Table A1, the 
eigenvalues for India indicate that the first principal component explains about 39.5 percent of the 
total variation, the second principal component explains another 28.7 percent and so on. The first 
principal component is computed as a linear combination of the six interest rate policy measures 
with weights given by the first eigenvector. In empirical applications it is quite common to use only 
the first principal component (see, e.g., Bandiera, Caprio, Honohan and Schiantarelli, 2000). 
However, in this case, the use of only the first principal component will leave 60.5 percent of the 
variations in the original series unaccounted for. As such, the absence of a large dominant 
principal component prompts us to consider all principal component series in order to obtain a 
more comprehensive measure of interest rate restraints. We use the percentages of variance as 
the weights to compute the index. The resulting indices are positively and significantly correlated 
with all underlying variables for both India and Malaysia, providing some evidence that they are 
reasonable indicators for the extent of interest rate restraints.
3  
 
5. Estimation Techniques 
5.1. Dynamic specification 
Although economic theory provides some guidance on the formulation of steady-state 
relationships, it is not particularly helpful in explaining dynamic adjustments, which are critical in 
any time series investigation. Hence, to derive a dynamic investment model suitable for 
econometric estimation, we follow Sims' (1974) approach by postulating a dynamic cost 
optimization problem that imposes costs on “mistakes” made by agents.  
 
Suppose every year, each firm in the economy has a desired level of private investment, 
*
t I . This 
ideal level of investment depends on a number of factors stated in Eq. (2). The actual level of 
private investment ( t I ) differs from that of the desired level (
*
t I ) due to the costs associated with 
                                                 
3 We have also attempted to use alternative measures of interest rate restraints such as the first principal 
component and simple arithmetic mean. Interestingly, these three measures are strongly correlated with 
correlation coefficients of greater than 0.98. We therefore believe that the results will be robust to the use of 
any of these measures. Page 12 of 28 
adjusting  t I . To illustrate how this would lead to a dynamic investment model, consider that in any 
period  t, the representative firm’s objective is to minimize the following penalty function by 
optimizing the level of investment: 
*2 2 * *
11 1
1
Min     ( ) ( ) 2 ( )( )       
t
t
tt t t t t t t t t I
t




⎧⎫ ⎡⎤ −+− − − − Ω ⎨⎬ ⎣⎦ ⎩⎭ ∑          (3) 
where 
t δ  is the discount factor which takes a value between 0 and 1, and  t Ω is the firm’s 
information set at time t. The first term in the square bracket represents the cost of deviation from 
the desired level of private investment. The second term is the costs of rapidly changing the level 
of private investment. The last term is included due to Hendry and von Ungern-Sternberg (1981), 
who argue the penalty is reduced if firms move in the correct direction, i.e., towards the equilibrium 
level of investment. The last term will converge to zero if the desired level of private investment 
remains unchanged.  
 
The firm seeks to minimize the expectation of the future stream of costs associated with 
investment decision making, conditional upon all available information  t Ω at time t. Since it is 
difficult to estimate the discount factor, we follow Callen, Hall and Henry (1990) by setting it to unity 
for simplicity. This does not affect the general form of the solution to the model. Invoking the 
certainty equivalence theorem and the rational expectations hypothesis so that expectations are 
replaced by future realizations, and choosing  t I  at time t to minimize expected costs leads to the 
following Euler condition: 
** *
11 11 (2 ) ( ) (2 ) ( ) tt t tt t a b I b II a c I c II −+ −+ +−+ = +−+                  (4) 
A solution for Eq. (4) may be defined as: 
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Δ= − +Δ+ + ∑                (7) 
 
We follow Nickell (1985) by assuming that 
*
ti I +  follows a random walk with drift: 
**
ti t I Ig i + =+                                               (8) 
where g is the drift term. Then substituting Eq. (8) into Eq. (7), and rearranging the terms we obtain 
the familiar error correction representation of the dynamic investment demand model: Page 13 of 28 
**
01 21 1 () tt t t I aa Ia I I − − Δ= +Δ− −                                (9) 
 
The error-correction term 
*
11 () tt I I −− −  captures the long-run equilibrium relationship between 
variables whereas the differenced terms 
* () t I Δ  capture the short-run dynamics. The use of an 
error-correction model (ECM) is appropriate in this context, since investment decisions are likely to 
be gradual and subject to revision in a developing country. Although equilibrium investment 
*
t I is 
unobservable, Eq. (9) can be estimated by using the steady-state private investment equation in 
Eq. (2). 
 
5.2 The ARDL estimator 
The dynamic adjustment of the private investment process can be characterized by a conditional 
ECM, which can be used to test for the existence of a long-run relationship using the ARDL bounds 
test developed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) and the ECM test of Banerjee, Dolado and 
Mestre (1998) to test for the presence of a cointegrated relationship. The former involves a 
standard F-test whereas the latter is a simple t-test. Using Eq. (9) with appropriate modifications, 
and replacing the long-run equilibrium level of private investment with the variables in Eq. (2), we 
obtain the following conditional ECM: 
00 1 , 1 0 ,
11 0 1
pp kk
tt j j t i t i j i j t i t
ji i j
I I DET I DET α ββ γ γ ε −− − −
== = =
Δ= + + + Δ + Δ + ∑∑ ∑ ∑                   (10) 
where It is real private investment, DETt is a vector of the determinants of private investment, 
which includes GDPt, COCt, PUBt, DCPt, IRRt and RLRt.  
 
The above can be estimated by OLS since Pesaran and Shin (1998) have shown that the OLS 
estimators of the short-run parameters are consistent and the ARDL based estimators of the long-
run coefficients are super-consistent in small sample sizes. Hence, valid inferences on the long-run 
parameters can be made using standard normal asymptotic theory. The main advantage of this 
approach is that it can be applied to the model regardless of whether the underlying variables are 
I(0) or I(1). Specifically, two separate statistics are employed to test for the existence of a long-run 
relationship in Eq. (10): 1) an F-test for the joint significance of coefficients on lagged levels terms 
of the conditional ECM ( 00 1 :. . . 0 k H β ββ == == ), and 2) a t-test for the significance of the 
coefficient associated with It-1 ( 00 :0 H β = ). The test for cointegration is provided by two asymptotic 
critical value bounds when the independent variables are either I(0) or I(1). The lower bound 
assumes all the independent variables are I(0), and the upper bound assumes they are I(1). If the 
test statistics exceed their respective upper critical values, the null is rejected and we can conclude 
that a long-run relationship exists. The above ARDL model also provides a convenient step to Page 14 of 28 
derive the long-run estimates and short-run dynamics for the private investment function, as 
detailed in Pesaran and Shin (1998). 
 
5.3 Alternative estimators 
To provide for robustness checks, the private investment is also estimated using two alternative 
long-run estimators, namely the fully-modified unrestricted error-correction model (FM-UECM) and 
the dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) estimator. The UECM estimator of Inder (1993) 
involves estimating the long-run parameters by incorporating adequate dynamics into the steady-
state specification to avoid omitted lagged variable bias, as given in the following equation.  
          0, ,
10 0 1
pp kk
tj j t i t i j i j t i t
ji i j
I DET I DET α βγ δε −−
== = =
= ++ Δ + Δ + ∑∑ ∑ ∑                        (11) 
 
However, this approach may not be asymptotically optimal given that it takes no account of the 
possible endogeneity of the underlying variables. In view of this, we follow Bewley (1979) by using 
the instrumental variable technique to correct the standard errors so that valid inference can be 
drawn. Specifically, lagged level variables are used as the instruments for the first-different current 





tt j j t i t i i jj t i
ji i j
I I DET I DET αβ γ δ −−
== = =
=− − − Δ − Δ ∑∑ ∑ ∑ % . The fully modified estimator is then 
obtained by employing the Phillips-Hansen non-parametric corrections to the regression of  t I %  on a 
constant and  , 1
k
j jt j DET β
= ∑ . The resulting estimator, known as full-modified unrestricted error-
correction model (FM-UECM), thus adequately deals with omitted lag variables bias, and Inder 
(1993) has shown that it is asymptotically optimal, even in the presence of endogenous 
explanatory variables.  
 
The key advantage of the DOLS procedure of Stock and Watson (1993) is that it allows for the 
presence of a mix of I(0) and I(1) variables in the cointegrated system. This estimator is 
asymptotically equivalent to the maximum likelihood estimator of Johansen (1988). Based on 
Monte Carlo evidence, Stock and Watson (1993) show that DOLS outperforms a number of 
alternative estimators of long-run parameters. It has also been shown to perform well in finite 
samples. This feature is particularly appealing given the small samples used in the present study. 
The estimation involves regressing one of the I(1) variables on the remaining I(1) variables, the I(0) 
variables, leads (p) and lags (-p) of the first difference of the I(1) variables, and a constant. Its 
specification is similar to that of Eq. (11), except that appropriate lead terms are included to correct 
for potential endogeneity problems and small sample bias, and provide estimates of the 
cointegrating vector which are asymptotically efficient. The long-run private investment model can Page 15 of 28 
be obtained from the reduced form solution by setting all differenced terms of the regressors to  
zero.  
 
Finally, to provide an analysis for the short-run dynamics, we obtain the error-correction term 
(ECT) by taking  1 0 1 1 ,1 ,1 ... tt k k t I DET DET α ββ −−− −− − −  to formulate an error-correction model. The 
ECT captures the evolution process on the variable of concern by which agents adjust for 
prediction errors made in the last period. The general-to-specific modeling approach is adopted to 
derive a satisfactory short-run dynamic model. This involves testing down the general model by 
successively eliminating statistically insignificant regressors and imposing data acceptable 
restrictions on the parameters to obtain the final parsimonious dynamic equation. In order to test 
the robustness of the results, all estimations are subject to various diagnostic tests.  
 
6.  Results 
6.1. Integration and cointegration analyses 
We begin our analysis by employing three unit root tests to assess the order of integration of the 
underlying variables - the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP), and Kwiatkowiski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests. The ADF and PP test the null of a unit root against the 
alternative of stationarity whereas the KPSS tests the null of stationarity against the alternative of a 
unit root. The results, which are not reported here to conserve space but available upon request, 
show that all variables appear to be either stationary, i.e. I(0), or integrated at order one, i.e., I(1). 
Given that none of the variables appears to be integrated at an order higher than one, this allows 
legitimate use of the proposed cointegration procedures. 
 
Table 1: Cointegration tests  
                 India             Malaysia 
  1 p =   2 p =   1 p =   2 p =  
A. Test statistics 
ARDL bounds test  





ECM test  







B. Model selection criteria 
AIC  -1.676 -1.576 -1.316 -1.684 
SBC  -0.903 -0.535 -0.473 -0.548 
C. Diagnostic checks 
2
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Notes: p is the lag length. The test statistics of the bounds tests are compared against the critical values 
reported in Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001). The estimation allows for an unrestricted intercept and no trend. 
The 10%, 5% and 1% critical value bounds for the F-test are (2.12, 3.23), (2.45, 3.61) and (3.15, 4.43), 
respectively. The 10%, 5% and 1% critical value bounds for the t-test are (-2.57, -4.04), (-2.86, -4.38) and (-
3.43, -4.99), respectively. 
2
NORMAL χ refers to the Jarque-Bera statistic of the test for normal residuals, 
2
SERIAL χ is  
the Breusch-Godfrey LM test statistic for no first order serial relationship, 
2
ARCH χ is the Engle’s test statistic for 
no autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity, and
2
RESET χ is the Ramsey’s test statistic for no functional 
misspecification. Numbers in parentheses indicate p-values. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% level of 
significance, respectively. 
 
Next, to perform cointegration tests on the private investment equation, we regress the conditional 
error-correction model in Eq. (10) by allowing for up to two lags. To ascertain the existence of a 
level relationship between the variables, this requires satisfying both the F- and the t-tests. Table 1 
gives the F-statistics for the ARDL bounds tests, t-statistics for the ECM test, the Akaike’s and 
Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criteria, denoted by AIC and SBC, respectively, and several 
diagnostic test statistics.  
 
The results indicate the null hypothesis that there exists no level private investment equation is 
rejected at the five percent significance level for both countries, irrespective of the lag length, 
providing strong support for the existence of a long-run relationship between private investment 
and its determinants. No evidence of cointegrating is found when other variables are used as the 
dependent variables. Both AIC and SBC point to a simpler dynamic structure for India but a richer 
dynamic specification of two lags is preferred for Malaysia. Following this dynamic structure 
suggested by the model selection criteria, we do not find any evidence of non-normality, serial 
correlation, autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity, and functional misspecification at the 
five percent significance level. We therefore follow this lag structure in the remaining analyses. 
 
6.2. The effect of financial sector policies on private investment 
Table 2 presents the results for the private investment model estimated using the ARDL estimator. 
It is evident that real output enters the long-run private investment equation significantly with the 
expected sign in both countries. Specifically, the long-run elasticity of real private investment with 
respect to real output is found to be 1.329 for India. A similar elasticity value of 1.323 is obtained 
for Malaysia. The finding that aggregate demand is a crucial determinant of private investment is 
consistent with the empirical evidence of Blejer and Khan (1984) for a group of 24 developing 
countries, Chibber and Shafik (1992) for Indonesia and Shafik (1992) for Turkey, and in particular, 
Athukorala and Sen (2002) for India and  Guimaraes and Unteroberdoerster (2006) for Malaysia. 
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An increase in the real user cost of capital leads to a contraction in real private investment in India, 
but such an effect is found to be insignificant in Malaysia. Specifically, a one percent increase in 
real user cost of capital will result in a 0.068 percent reduction in real private investment in India. 
The finding of a small effect of real user cost of capital is in line with the results of Schmidt-Hebbel 
and Muller (1992) for Morocco and Guncavdi, Bleaney and McKay (1998) for Turkey. This implies 
that increases in investment incentives may have to be very large to induce a significant increase 
in private capital formation. The results underscore the importance of providing adequate 
investment incentives to stimulate investment in the private sector. Thus, the predictions of the 
neoclassical investment model are supported by the Indian data. On the other hand, the results for 
Malaysia suggest that investment incentive has no role to play in stimulating capital formation in 
the private sector. Thus, changes in prices that affect investment incentives seem to be ineffective 
in stimulating private investment in Malaysia. This is likely to be the case if investors require more 
time to be convinced that these policy changes are likely to be permanent.   
 
Table 2: ARDL estimate of the private investment equation 
                     India                 Malaysia 
 Coefficient  p-value Coefficient  p-value 
A. The long-run relationship (Dep. = lnIt) 
Intercept  -4.546
*** 0.000  -8.792
*** 0.000 
lnGDPt  1.329
*** 0.000  1.323
*** 0.000 
lnCOCt  -0.068
***  0.008 0.009 0.767 
lnPUBt 0.024  0.739  0.269
*** 0.000 
DCPt  -0.011 0.707  -0.021
*** 0.001 
IRRt  0.001
*  0.066 0.001 0.244 
RLRt  -0.006
** 0.010  0.045
*** 0.000 
B. The short-run dynamic model (Dep. =∆lnIt) 
Intercept  -0.050  0.134 0.030 0.449 
ECTt-1  -0.312
*** 0.001  -0.787
*** 0.000 
∆lnGDPt  1.001
* 0.055  1.663
*** 0.000 
∆lnCOCt  -0.063
** 0.010     
∆lnPUBt    0.520
*** 0.000 
∆DCPt    -0.005
*** 0.009 
∆RLRt    0.038
*** 0.000 
∆lnCOCt-1  -0.063
** 0.011     
C. Diagnostic checks  Test-statistic  p-value Test-statistic p -value 
2
NORMAL χ   1.342 0.511 0.028 0.986 Page 18 of 28 
2
SERIAL χ   0.076 0.782 0.509 0.475 
2
ARCH χ   0.024 0.875 1.703 0.191 
2
RESET χ   2.323 0.127 1.424 0.232 
Notes: see previous table. 
 
As regards public investment, the long-run elasticity is found to be significant only in Malaysia, with 
a long-run elasticity of 0.269. This result confirms the hypothesis of complementarity between 
private and public investment. The finding of a crowding-in effect from government investment is in 
line with a majority of studies, including Aschauer (1989) for the United States, Greene and 
Villanueva (1991) for 23 developing countries, and Shafik (1992) for Egypt. However, such an 
effect is found to be insignificant for India. Public spending on infrastructure and human capital 
formation is likely to crowd in private investment whereas other types of public investment tend to 
have the reverse effect. It is probable that these opposing forces exactly offset each other, leaving 
little net effect of public investment on private investment in India.  
 
The empirical results show a negative and significant effect of directed credit programs in private 
sector capital formation in Malaysia. In particular, a one percentage point increase in the measure 
of the extent of directed credit programs decreases real private investment by about 0.02 
percentage points. This finding is consistent with the McKinnon-Shaw thesis, pinpointing the 
importance of allowing for free allocation of resources in the economy in order to revive the private 
investment slumps experienced by Malaysia since the Asian financial crisis. The results also imply 
that the allocation of credit to priority sectors has reduced funds available to other sectors and 
resulted in a displacement of investment projects with potentially higher returns. Our results 
corroborate the findings of Odedokun (1996) and Yaron, Benjamin and Charitonenko (1998), who 
have found a negative effect of directed credit policies. However, an insignificant effect is found for 
India, based on the results provided by the ARDL estimator.  
 
The results also suggest that interest rate restraints have a positive and significant effect on private 
investment in India, although its magnitude is negligible. To the extent that the interest rate 
restraints imposed on the Indian financial system have a mild effect in encouraging investment 
activities in the private sector, the results tend to support the neostructuralists arguments of van 
Wijnbergen (1982) and Taylor (1983) that interest controls may increase the flow of credit to the 
private sector. However, this effect is found to be statistically insignificant in Malaysia, at the 
conventional levels of significance.  
 
On the other hand, higher reserve and liquidity requirements tend to discourage private capital 
formation in India, but its influence is found to be positive in Malaysia. The magnitude of the Page 19 of 28 
coefficients is found to be -0.006 and 0.045 in India and Malaysia, respectively. The results for 
India support the view of the neostructuralists and McKinnon-Shaw school that higher reserve and 
liquidity requirements constitute a leakage in the intermediation process, and this reduces the 
volume of loanable funds. The results for Malaysia, on the other hand, are more in line with the 
proposition of Courakis (1984) that higher reserve requirements increase the profit-maximization 
deposit rate and hence the volume of loanable funds. 
 
Turning to the short-run dynamics, the regression results for the conditional ECM of  ln t I Δ  
reported in panel B of Table 2 show several interesting features. All coefficients are statistically 
significant at the conventional levels. In first-differenced form, the variables have expected signs, 
consistent with the results reported in the long-run model. The coefficients on  1 t ECT − , which 
measure the speed of adjustment back to the long-run equilibrium value, are statistically significant 
at the one percent level and correctly signed, i.e., negative. This implies that an error-correction 
mechanism exists in both countries so that the deviation from long-run equilibrium has a significant 
impact on the growth rate of real private investment. Private investment in India adjusts at about 31 
percent every year to restore equilibrium when there is a shock to the steady-state relationship. 
The speed of adjustment is found to be much faster in Malaysia, at a rate of about 79 percent 
every year. Finally, the Asian financial crisis dummy is found to be statistically insignificant and has 
the wrong sign for Malaysia. It is therefore dropped from the estimation.   
 
6.3. Robustness checks 
The results reported in panel C of Table 2 show that the regression specifications fit remarkably 
well and pass the diagnostic tests against non-normal residuals, serial correlation, autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity and functional misspecification. The structural stability of the private 
investment equation is examined using the cumulative sum (henceforth, CUSUM) and CUSUM of 
squares tests on the recursive residuals. The CUSUM test is able to detect systematic changes in 
the regression coefficients whereas the CUSUM of squares test is able to detect sudden changes 
from the constancy of the regression coefficients. Figure 1 shows that the statistics generally lie 
within or on the five percent confidence interval bands, suggesting no structural instability in the 
residuals of the private investment equations for both India and Malaysia. 
 





















































Figure 2 shows the actual and predicted levels of private investment. Predicted lnIt is the long-run 
(static) equilibrium levels of private investment, which are constructed based on the long-run 
estimates reported in panel A of Table 2. It is evident that the predicted series track the actual 
series very closely over time for both models, suggesting that the private investment model is very 
well fitted. 
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6.4. Alternative estimators 
The sensitivity of the results is further assessed using the FM-UECM procedure and the DOLS 
approach. The results presented in Table 3 are, by and large, consistent with those obtained using 
the ARDL estimator. However, a few discrepancies have been noted. First of all, the coefficient on 
public investment becomes negative and statistically significant at the five percent level when the 
private investment equation for India is estimated using DOLS. This finding corroborates the 
results of Pradhan, Ratha and Sarma (1990) for the Indian experience. A similar finding is obtained 
for the measure of directed credit programs in India when the model is estimated using both the 
FM-UECM and DOLS procedures. Thus, in contrast to the earlier results estimated using ARDL, 
directed credit programs in India are likely to exert a negative effect on private investment. This 
result is more plausible given that much of the directed loans have gone to large farmers (Hanson, 
2001) or increase capital intensity of production (Binswanger and Khandker, 1992), which are not 
necessary pro-growth in nature. In the case of Malaysia, the only disparity noted is that the index of 
interest rate restraints becomes statistically significant at the one percent level when the model is 
estimated using DOLS. The short-run results are, in general, in line with their long-run 
counterparts. The results are robust to a series of diagnostic checks reported in panel C. 
 
Table 3: FM-UECM and DOLS estimate of the private investment equation  
                        India                  Malaysia 
 FM-UECM  DOLS  FM-UECM  DOLS 

















































































B. The short-run dynamic model (Dep. =∆lnIt) 
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∆DCPt       -0.005
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(0.034) 
∆RLRt     0.039
*** 













C. Diagnostic checks 
2



































Notes: Numbers in parentheses indicate p-values. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Many developing countries have reformed their financial systems over the last few 
decades. While an increased level of financial integration has generally been observed across the 
world, how financial reform policies impact on private investment remain relatively unknown. 
Against this backdrop, this paper attempts to assess the effects of several types of financial sector 
policies, including directed credit programs, interest rate controls, and reserve and liquidity 
requirements, on the evolution of private investment. The private investment model is tested based 
on the experience of two fast growing developing economies in which their rich histories in financial 
sector reforms provide an ideal ground for further analysis.  
We examined the determinants of real private investment in an autoregressive distributed 
lag framework, paying particular attention to the testing for a long-run cointegrating relationship 
between the variables under consideration. Employing the ARDL bounds and the ECM 
cointegration techniques, the empirical evidence showed a significant steady-state relationship 
between private investment and its determinants. After documenting these basic cointegration 
results, we derived the long-run estimates using several estimators. The key qualitative aspects of 
the results are fairly insensitive to the choice of estimators.  
The results suggest that financial repressionist policies, in the form of significant presence 
of directed credit controls, appear to have retarded private investment in both India and Malaysia. 
However, against the financial liberalization thesis, interest rate restraints appear to be an effective 
device in stimulating private investment in both countries. While high reserve and liquidity 
requirements tend to have an undesirable effect on private investment in India, this effect is found 
to be favorable in Malaysia.  
Overall, the results for India seem to provide more support for the financial liberalization 
thesis. On the contrary, the results for Malaysia tend to provide more support for the financial 
repressionist ideology. This is probably due to the presence of a better quality of institutions in 
Malaysia. As highlighted by Honohan and Stiglitz (2001), financial restraints are more likely to work Page 23 of 28 
well in environments with strong regulatory capacity. In sum, our results tend to support the 
proposition that some form of financial restraints may help stimulating private investment. The 
study highlights that since financial sector policies may have different effects on private investment, 
it is important to consider each component of financial sector reforms separately in the analysis of 
investment behavior.  
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Appendix: Principal component analysis 
 
Table A1: The interest rate restraints index for India 
  Principal component 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Eigenvalues  2.370 1.722 1.010 0.489 0.266 0.143 
%  of  variance  0.395 0.287 0.168 0.081 0.044 0.024 
Cumulative  %  0.395 0.682 0.850 0.932 0.976 1.000 
  Eigenvector 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 
FDRt  -0.552 0.262 0.281 0.034 0.060 -0.737 
DRCt  -0.544 -0.173 -0.267 0.344  0.623  0.311 
DRFt  -0.416 -0.477 0.172 0.301 -0.672 0.167 
FLRt  -0.176 0.287 -0.860 -0.034 -0.362 -0.124 
LRCt  -0.151 -0.617 -0.169 -0.719 0.118 -0.194 
LRFt  -0.415 0.459 0.230 -0.522 -0.112 0.529 
Notes: FDRt = fixed deposit dummy, DRCt = deposit rate ceiling dummy, DRFt = deposit rate floor dummy, 
FLRt = fixed lending dummy, LRCt = lending rate ceiling, and LRFt = lending rate floor. 
 
 
Table A2: The interest rate restraints index for Malaysia 
  Principal component 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Eigenvalues  3.171 1.135 0.853 0.561 0.206 0.075 
%  of  variance  0.528 0.189 0.142 0.093 0.034 0.012 
Cumulative  %  0.528 0.718 0.860 0.953 0.988 1.000 
 Eigenvector 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 
PSRt  -0.491 0.024 0.125 -0.570 0.249 -0.596 
PIRt  -0.360 0.485 -0.418 0.522 -0.231 -0.368 
MILt  0.440 0.155 0.593 0.100 -0.414  -0.499 
MALt  -0.295 0.631 0.542 0.030 0.186 0.431 
MIDt  0.329 0.518 -0.384  -0.608  -0.303 0.124 
MADt  0.491 0.273 -0.129 0.148 0.766 -0.243 
Notes: PSRt = maximum lending rate for priority sector, PIRt = policy intervention rate, MILt = minimum 
lending rate, MALt = maximum lending rate, MIDt = minimum deposit rate, and MADt = maximum deposit 
rate. 
 